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International reserve accumulation by developing countries is just one example of the 
puzzling behavior of international capital flows.  Capital should flow to where its return 
is highest, which ought to be where capital is scare.  Yet recent data suggest the opposite 
– net capital flows from developing countries to industrialized countries.  This paper 
examines the role of financial market development in the accumulation of international 
reserves.  In countries with underdeveloped capital markets the government’s 
accumulation of reserves may substitute for what would otherwise be private sector 
capital outflows. Effectively, these governments are acting as financial intermediaries, 
channeling domestic savings away from local uses and into international capital markets, 
thereby offsetting the effects of domestic financial constraints that lead to excessive 
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Introduction 
   
China’s official foreign exchange reserves have passed the two trillion dollar 
mark, equivalent to approximately $2000 for every Chinese citizen.
1
  The growth and liberalization of financial markets in industrial countries over the 
past three decades provides developing countries unprecedented access to international 
capital markets, and exposes them to sometimes dramatic and sudden swings in capital 
flows.  The 1990s witnessed a number of economic crises in developing countries that 
were accompanied by (if not precipitated by) outflows of international capital.  This 
recent experience with capital flow reversals can, at least in part, explain the desire by 
developing countries to decrease their dependence on international capital by 
accumulating foreign reserves. 
  Although China is 
currently the country with the largest foreign reserve accumulation, reserves have risen 
dramatically for many developing countries in recent years.  Economic models suggest a 
number of motivations for reserve accumulation, including precautionary and mercantilist 
motives, which may be especially compelling for developing countries.  However, the 
recent upsurge in reserve accumulation among developing countries cannot be explained 
solely on the basis of these rationales.  This paper examines a potential new role for 
reserve accumulation in helping to mitigate distortions created by the undeveloped 
financial markets of developing countries. 
  While global financial markets have recently been tumultuous, the trend has been 
for financial markets in industrial countries to deepen and broaden at the same time that 
markets in many developing countries remain incomplete.  This paper focuses on the 
                                                 
1 In June 2009 Chinese foreign exchange reserves reached $2,132 billion.   2 
implications for developing countries of underdeveloped capital markets.  In a series of 
papers, Ricardo Caballero and coauthors have developed models showing that 
underdeveloped capital markets cause under-valuation of international resources by the 
private sector, which encourages excessive external borrowing, dollarization of 
international liabilities, and other actions that increase their exposure to potential capital 
shortfalls.
2  One way to mitigate the costs of this exposure is for developing country 
governments to accumulate international reserves.
3
  The analysis in the paper considers the role of financial market underdevelopment 
in motivating reserve accumulation by developing countries, while also allowing for the 
more traditional mercantilist and precautionary motives.  In theory there can be a strict 
distinction between the precautionary motive, which seeks to smooth consumption 
fluctuations, and the underdeveloped financial markets motive, which seeks to offset a 
tightening of a financial constraint.  However, in practice, these two motivations for 
reserve accumulation may be difficult to disentangle.  In particular, the desire to smooth 
intertemporal consumption is likely to be influenced by financial market constraints.   
Whereas Aiyagari (1994) in a closed economy framework suggests that for the U.S. 
private sector precautionary savings is likely to be sufficient to relax financial constraints, 
this is less likely to be the case in developing countries where distortions may bias the 
private sector against saving, thereby providing incentives for the public sector to step in. 
   
  Official foreign exchange reserve holdings by developing countries greatly 
exceed those of industrial countries (in the case of China, in absolute terms, and in most 
                                                 
2 See for example Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2004, 2005). 
3 Caballero and Panageas (2004) suggest that while international reserve accumulation is not the best 
insurance against sudden stops, in practice many countries seem to rely on reserves for this purpose.  See 
also Summers (2006) and Devereux (2009) for discussions of the reasons for and implications of reserve 
accumulation by developing countries.   3 
other cases relative to the sizes of their economies).  This is yet another example of the 
capital flows paradox described by Lucas (1990). Capital should flow to where its return 
is highest, which ought to be where capital is scare.  If instead capital flows from the 
capital-poor developing world to the capital-rich industrialized world, the explanation is 
likely to be found in distortions not entertained in standard models.   
I.  Motives for the Accumulation of International Reserves 
  International reserves held by government authorities are part of national wealth, 
and were originally important for countries with fixed exchange rates that wanted to 
avoid costly adjustments to disturbances in the external sector of the economy.  For 
example, if a country ran a current account deficit, reserves could be used by the 
government to forestall an exchange rate depreciation that might otherwise occur.  
However, in this view of reserves, as a country’s level of wealth increases over time, or if 
a country moves away from a fixed exchange rate regime, it is less clear how much of a 
share of the national wealth should be devoted to international reserve assets.  
  Heller (1966) provides one of the first attempts at calculating an optimal country 
specific level of international reserves based on what he termed the precautionary motive.  
The three parameters he thought important to this calculation include: (1) the cost of 
adjusting to an external imbalance (measured as the propensity to import); (2) the cost of 
holding liquid international reserves (measured as the difference between the return on 
the reserves relative to a benchmark return on domestic bonds); and (3) the probability 
that there will actually be a need for reserves of a given magnitude (based on the history 
of past external imbalances).   4 
  In the period following the 1971 break down of the Bretton Woods system, while 
many industrial countries moved away from fixed exchange rate systems toward more 
flexible regimes, countries continued to hold reserves despite the disappearance of their 
original purpose which was to help finance current account imbalances.  In practice there 
seem to have evolved a number of “rules of thumb” to determine optimal reserve levels 
loosely based on Heller’s precautionary motive.  These rules included maintaining 
reserves equivalent to: (1) three months of imports (to offset current account shocks); (2) 
5-20 percent of M2 (to be able to shore up confidence in the value of the domestic 
currency in the event of a currency crisis); and (3) the value of all debt obligations falling 
due within the following year (in the event of a sudden disappearance of short-term 
capital inflows)
4
  All of these rules of thumb imply a desire on the part of governments to acquire 
reserves to serve as a cushion against adverse economic shocks of one form or another, 
and as such can be categorized as satisfying Heller’s precautionary motive.  Frenkel and 
Jovanovic (1981) provide a more formal approach to modeling the precautionary motive 
for holding reserves using a stochastic inventory-theoretic framework.  Their model 
indicates that optimal reserve holdings increase with the volatility of reserves (which are 
presumably influenced by current account shocks, the value of the domestic currency, 
and capital inflows) subject to a fixed cost of reserve accumulation and the opportunity 
cost of holding reserves. Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992) follow in this buffer stock 
modeling tradition while also linking international reserves with sovereign risk.
. 
5
                                                 
4 This is often referred to as the “Greenspan-Guidotti rule”. 
 
5 Durdu, Mendoza and Terrones (2009) show that emerging markets that face large external shocks have an 
incentive to hold reserves even when households and firms can smooth domestic income fluctuations.  
Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) consider the joint decision to accumulate reserves and issue sovereign debt.  In   5 
  An alternative view of reserve accumulation is that it is the byproduct of a 
government strategy to keep the international value of the domestic currency low in order 
to boost export growth.  In this view purchases of foreign reserves are not motivated by a 
desire to smooth consumption in the face of external shocks, but rather they are the 
unintended consequence of sterilized interventions in the foreign exchange market.
6
  There have been a number of recent empirical studies attempting to measure 
whether the precautionary or mercantilist motive better explains foreign reserve 
accumulations by both industrialized and developing countries.  These studies generally 
find evidence in support of both motivations (see, for example, Aizenman and Lee 
(2007)), while at the same time finding that neither motivation fully explains the recent 
upsurge in reserve accumulations by developing countries (Jeanne (2007) and Jeanne and 
Ranciere (2007)).  As Figure 1 indicates, any theory of official reserve accumulation that 
hopes to explain the recent data will need to match the timing of the dramatic increase in 
reserve accumulations by developing countries over the 1990s and early 2000s.  Even if 
we allow for an increase in precautionary holdings in the aftermath of the developing 
  This 
rationale for reserve accumulation, typically labeled the mercantilist motive, has been 
advanced by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) as a description of the 
development strategy followed by many East Asian countries, particularly China.   
                                                                                                                                                 
the context of a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model they find that optimal policy is not to hold reserves 
at all (since reserves can be used to pay down the debt).  Of course, in practice countries generally both 
issue debt and hold reserves. 
6 There is a large literature exploring the efficacy of sterilized intervention policy (see for example, 
Dominguez and Frankel (1993b) and Fatum and Hutchison (2003)).  In the traditional portfolio balance 
model sterilized intervention can only be effective if domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes 
and  Ricardian equivalence does not hold. Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) and Dominguez (2003) provide 
empirical evidence suggesting that sterilized interventions by industrial countries have, at times, effectively 
influenced currency values.  The efficacy of sterilized intervention policies in developing countries has 
been less widely studied, in large part because governments have been reluctant to provide detailed data on 
their operations.  Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) document the extent to which the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves has been sterilized by developing countries since 1990.   6 
country crises of the 1990s, studies suggest that current reserve accumulations far exceed 
warranted levels (Jeanne (2007)).
7
Table 1 presents data from the financial accounts of industrialized and developing 
countries over the period 1990 through 2004.  For developing countries over 40 percent 
of foreign asset accumulation consists of official reserves, while for industrialized 
countries official reserves make up only 2 percent of gross foreign assets. Figure 2 
provides a time series view of the decomposition of foreign assets for developing 
countries over time.  The figure highlights the increasing relative importance of official 
reserve accumulation for developing countries especially since 2000.  On the liability 
side, developing countries rely much more heavily on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
than do the industrialized countries.
 
8
Underlying most standard models of economic growth is the assumption that 
investment leads to capital accumulation, which in turn, leads to higher levels of 
production.  It is therefore instructive to consider how measures of capital flows (as 
shown in the cross-country financial accounts reported in Table 1) are related to 
aggregate investment rates.  Chen (2007) shows that higher investment rates are 
   Figure 3 depicts official reserves as a fraction of 
net FDI liabilities, in which the recent dramatic upsurge in reserves evident in Figure 1 
for developing countries (where reserves are measured as a fraction of GDP), is no longer 
apparent.  Hence if one views reserves in the context of private sector (FDI) liabilities, 
the trend patterns of reserve accumulation across industrial and developing countries are 
no longer so starkly divergent. 
                                                 
7 A notable exception is a recent study by Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2008) which suggests that if 
reserve adequacy is gauged against the size of the banking sector the recent reserves accumulation in 
emerging markets is less puzzling. 
8 Developing countries seem to be increasingly making direct investments into industrial countries, 
providing yet another example of the capital flow paradox, see Chari, Chen and Dominguez (2009).   7 
associated with lower net capital inflows for developing countries.  Further, the 
component of capital flows that is driving this counter intuitive result is official foreign 
reserves.  Figure 4 presents a cross-country scatter plot of investment rates and reserve 
holdings showing a significant positive relationship for developing countries.  A similar 
scatter plot for industrialized countries shows no relationship between investment and 
reserves.   
The negative relationship between rates of investment and capital inflows for 
developing countries most likely reflects credit constraints.   The pace of financial market 
development, like reserve accumulation, has diverged markedly between industrialized 
countries, where markets have generally deepened and broadened, and developing 
countries, where this deepening has yet to take place. It seems reasonable to hypothesize 
that in countries with underdeveloped capital markets the private sector faces constraints 
on its ability to borrow.  In this situation the government’s accumulation of reserves may 
act as a substitute for what would otherwise be private sector capital outflows. The next 
section presents a simple model to help clarify the role of reserve accumulation in 
loosening financial constraints for countries with less developed financial markets. 
II.  A Simple Model of Private Sector External Underinsurance 
  It is useful to start with a simple example to highlight the problem of 
underinsurance by the private sector in developing countries.  Consider an economy over 
three periods with a single consumption good.  In period zero firms make initial 
investments, in period one some firms need to re-invest as part of the normal 
restructuring of an economy, and in period two the output is produced.    8 
  In period one the firms that need to make additional investments will be able to 
produce less than otherwise, though with full re-investment all firms produce the same 
output.  Those firms that need to re-invest finance this by borrowing, and must provide 
their creditors with collateral.  If we make the realistic assumption that domestic lenders 
allow some fraction of domestic plant and equipment to serve as collateral, whereas 
foreign lenders do not, collateral is limited in an asymmetric way; firms will have less 
access to foreign lenders than they do to domestic lenders.   In this simple setup the 
supply of loans can be assumed to be elastic where the domestic and foreign interest rate 
are equalized, up to the point that firms borrow the maximum available from foreigners 
and beyond this point the supply of loans is completely inelastic.
9
If firms know that they may be financially constrained in period one, they should 
optimally borrow less in period zero in order to save resources.  Yet the model suggests 
that firms will not insure themselves against this potential financing constraint.  Why not?  
The problem is that the return to savings in period zero does not reflect the true marginal 
product of financing in period one because of the distortions caused by collateral 
constraints.  In equilibrium external financing is under-valued, and as a consequence 
firms will be underinsured against potential capital shortfalls. 
  The domestic interest 
rate in period one lies above the foreign interest rate, as a consequence of the more 
binding collateral constraint on foreign borrowing, and below the marginal product of full 
re-investment.  
  There are a number of possible solutions to the underinsurance problem, at least 
in theory.  The key is to find a way to bring the ex post price of international resources in 
                                                 
9 Loans are always worth it from the standpoint of the borrower because of the high return to reinvestment 
(the investment function is assumed to be strictly increasing, positive and convex).   9 
line with the marginal product of re-investment. One such solution is reserve 
accumulation by the government.  In this case, governments purchase international bonds 
and sterilize the effects of this purchase on the home money supply by issuing domestic 
bonds. If the interest rate offered on these domestic bonds in period zero is higher than 
the period one domestic interest rate, the government is essentially subsidizing savings in 
period zero, which is exactly what is needed to mitigate the underinsurance problem.    
III.  Empirical Evidence Connecting Reserve Accumulation, Private Sector Under-
Insurance and Financial Market Underdevelopment 
This simple model provides two important predictions for reserve accumulating 
countries. The first implication is that these countries will exhibit private sector 
underinsurance against future capital shortfalls.  The second implication is that there will 
be a wedge between the collateral value of domestic projects in the home country and 
international valuations of the same projects.  In practice, while cross-country data on 
private and public sector external debt is available, data measuring the “collateral wedge” 
are not. There is, however, a large literature focused on the measurement of financial 
market development which is likely to be directly related to collateral constraints (see, for 
example, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2000).  This literature provides a number of 
suggested measures of financial market (under)development including:  financial 
openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006), money and quasi-money supply as a percentage of GDP 
(Lane and Burke, 2001 and Obstfeld et. al., 2008), and the sum of private credit creation 
and stock market capitalization (Ito and Chinn, 2008).  Another measure of financial 
market development is the extent of external liabilities, based on the assumption that 
countries with less developed domestic financial markets also have fewer external   10 
liabilities.  Figure 5 shows one such measure of financial development (fin_dev1) that 
sums foreign portfolio equity and debt liabilities divided by GDP for industrialized and 
developing countries over the period 1977 through 2004.
10
An alternative measure of financial market development (fin_dev2) focuses on the 
size of domestic financial markets.  Figure 6, which measures financial development as 
the sum of a country’s domestic private credit creation and stock market capitalization as 
a ratio of GDP, shows again the widening divergence between industrialized and 
developing countries in the late 1990s.  Interestingly, this measure of domestic financial 
market size rises for industrialized countries (and to some extent developing countries) 
earlier than is apparent in figure 5, which is based on external rather than domestic 
liabilities. 
  The figure shows that while 
this measure of financial markets has increased steadily in the industrialized countries, 
the growth rate of financial markets has been substantially slower for developing 
countries.  It is also the case that the divergence in growth rates between the two groups 
of countries widens at around the same time as reserve accumulation by developing 
countries starts to accelerate.   
Yet another measure of financial markets, focused more narrowly on the banking 
sector, is the ratio of money and quasi-money to GDP.  Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor 
(2008) make the case that the primary reason for reserve accumulation is to protect the 
domestic banking sector during periods of capital flight.  In their view financial 
development increases the need for reserves because it allows domestic residents to 
convert domestic bank deposits into foreign exchange, leading to both a run on the 
                                                 
10 This measure of financial market development is not the “international financial integration” measure 
used in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), which is the sum of foreign assets (which includes reserve assets) 
and liabilities over GDP.     11 
banking system and a depreciation of the domestic currency.  Figure 7 depicts the ratio of 
M2 to GDP for industrialized and developing countries, which shows a steady upward 
trend for developing countries over this time period.   
Financial market development need not only be measured in terms of the size of 
markets or deposits, presumably the quality of institutions within a country will also 
influence the depth and breath of markets.  Cheung and Ito (2009) focus on the 
relationship between a number of country specific institutional variables (corruption, 
bureaucratic quality, law and order, form of government, government fractionalization) 
and reserve accumulation and find weak evidence for their importance.  One potential 
explanation is that many of these indicators do not change, or change only infrequently in 
some countries.  In the empirical work to follow country fixed effects are included to 
capture these time invariant institutional differences. 
In the empirical literature that attempts to estimate reserve holdings for panels of 
countries based on mercantilist and precautionary motives
11 the standard regression 
specification includes: scale factors (GDP), an indicator of exchange rate flexibility, 
indicators of openness and vulnerability to external shocks, the share of imports in GDP, 
and the ratio of M2 to GDP.
12
                                                 
11 See, for example, Aizenman and Marion (2003).  Machlup (1966) argued that the behavior of 
governments toward reserve accumulation was very much like that of his wife with regard to her wardrobe: 
no matter how many dresses she possessed, she added to her stock of them each year.  “Mrs. Machlup’s 
Wardrobe theory” involves including lagged values of reserves in the specification.  Lagged reserves are 
generally not found to be statistically significant in any of the specifications estimated in this paper. 
  The first column of Table 2 presents the results of a panel 
12 Previous studies have also included a number of different measures of the cost of holding reserves 
(generally an interest rate on foreign assets relative to a domestic benchmark).  Rodrik (2006) estimates that 
the cost of holding reserves is close to 1% of GDP for all developing countries, however, this variable is 
never found to be statistically or economically important in explaining reserve accumulations.   12 
regression that includes 56 (industrialized and developing
13
 
) countries over the 1977 to 
2004 time period using this standard specification: 
01 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 it it it it it it it it it R GDP ExRate CC Crisis CurOver ShImp ShM αα α α α α α α ε = + + ++ + + + +  
where R is holdings of foreign reserves valued in logged millions of US dollars (from 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007),  ExRate is an exchange rate classification based on the 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) defacto regimes, CC measures financial account openness 
(capital controls) based on Chinn and Ito’s (2006) classifications,  Crisis indicates the 
dates of currency crisis as defined by Frankel and Rose (1996), CurOver indicates 
currency-overvaluation relative to PPP, ShImp is the share of imports of goods and 
services in GDP, and ShM2 is the ratio of M2 to GDP.  The panel estimation includes 
country fixed effects (so that coefficients are estimated from the time-series variation 
within countries). 
  The results from this standard regression specification suggest that the various 
explanatory variables enter with the expected signs.  Wealthier countries hold more 
reserves than do poorer countries.  Countries that have more open capital markets 
(potentially making them more vulnerable to sudden stops) hold more reserves.  The 
indicator of currency crises suggests, as expected, that those countries experiencing crises 
held fewer reserves during their crises.  Those countries whose exchange rate is 
“undervalued” relative to PPP, who have higher shares of imports relative to GDP, and 
who have higher ratios of M2 to GDP, hold more reserves. 
                                                 
13 Data constraints limit the sample of countries included in the empirical work.  In particular, none of the 
poorest countries are in the sample.  One plausible implication from the simple model in section 2 is that 
very poor countries that are completely closed to international flows have no incentive to hold foreign 
reserves.  This implication is unfortunately not testable with the available data.   13 
  The next two columns in Table 2 include additional variables suggested by the 
potential role of underdeveloped financial markets in explaining reserve accumulation by 
developing countries. One issue that arises in this context is how to distinguish proxies 
for the precautionary motive (the CC, Crisis and ShM2 variables) from those that reflect 
financial market underdevelopment. The precautionary motive for holding reserves stems 
from the desire to smooth consumption distortions intertemporally in the face of sudden 
reversals of international capital inflows.  Of course, it may well be that those countries 
most likely to face sudden stops (or capital flight) are also countries that have 
underdeveloped financial markets
14
  An important feature of the simple model presented earlier is its emphasis on the 
role of public sector reserve accumulation as a solution to the private sector external 
underinsurance problem.  One way to capture this interaction between the private and 
public sectors is to test whether reserves are influenced differently by private and public 
liabilities.  The regression reported in column two of Table 2 includes measures of public 
and private liabilities as explanatory variables.  As the model predicts, countries with 
, potentially making it difficult to separate these two 
motives for reserve accumulation.  The objective here is not to attempt to allocate 
weights across the different motives for reserve accumulations, but rather to expand the 
set of explanatory variables in the empirical specification to incorporate the insights 
provided by the under-insurance view, and in so doing test whether one can more readily 
explain the most recent upsurge in reserve accumulation.  
                                                 
14 Martin and Rey (2006) intriguingly show that financial globalization in emerging markets may inherently 
lead to self-fulfilling financial crashes and further market incompleteness.   14 
higher levels of private sector liabilities hold greater reserves, while countries with higher 
levels of public sector liabilities
15
  Column three and four of Table 2 include the two alternative measures of 
financial market development, the first based on the size of external liabilities and the 
second based on the size of domestic liabilities. Recall that the model predicts that 
countries with less developed financial markets are likely to hold greater reserves.  This 
prediction is confirmed in both sets of regression results, in that the sign of the financial 
market development indicator is negative and highly statistically significant.  Three 
points are worth noting from these results: (1) the size and significance of the standard 
precautionary and mercantilist variables are little changed by the inclusion of the 
financial development measure, (2) both measures of financial market development 
(based on external and domestic liabilities) yield similar results (the measure based on the 
size of domestic markets is not available for China and for a number of other countries 
over certain years so that the sample size is substantially smaller in this specification)
 hold fewer reserves. 
16
                                                 
15 The predicted sign on public liabilities is less clear cut than is the case for private liabilities.  If 
governments fully sterilize reserve accumulations, this will result in higher public debt and a positive 
correlation with reserves.  Excluding public liabilities in all relevant regression specifications has no 
qualitative effects on the other included variables, these results are not reported but are available upon 
request. 
, 
(3) the prediction from the Obstfeld, Stambaugh and Taylor (2008) model that financial 
development increases the need for reserves is not borne out in these regressions.  While 
I find, as they do, that the share of M2 to GDP is economically and statistically 
significant in explaining reserve accumulation, increased financial development in these 
16 In some developing countries governments, rather than the private sector, play a large role in financial 
intermediation, for example by providing credit through state-owned institutions.  In order to take this into 
account, one can use estimates from La Porta et al (2002) of the ratios of government ownership of banks 
to adjust the private credit creation component of fin_dev2.  Estimates using this adjusted financial 
development measure (fin_dev3) did not significantly differ from those reported using the unadjusted 
measure.  These results are available upon request.   15 
regressions decreases reserve accumulation.
17
  While some of the empirical specifications presented in Table 2 are fairly 
standard in the literature, two issues are worth noting.  First, a number of the explanatory 
variables included in the various regression specifications are likely to be correlated.  For 
example, wealthier countries are more likely to have open capital markets, high levels of 
liabilities, and highly developed financial markets.  Table 3 presents cross-correlations 
across a number of the key variables used in the regressions which were found to have 
relatively high correlations (variables with low cross-correlations are not included in the 
table).  The highest (positive) correlation is found between public and private external 
liabilities, followed by the correlations of public and private liabilities and GDP 
(indicating, unsurprisingly, that it is the wealthier countries that are doing most of the 
borrowing).  The domestic financial development measure (fin_dev2) is also highly 
(positively) correlated with the share of M2 in GDP.  The finding that many of the 
“controls” in the regression, variables capturing the precautionary and mercantilist 
motives, are correlated with the measures of financial development, biases against the 
finding of an additional financial markets motive.  In order to take account of possible 
multicollinearity (and interaction effects) among the explanatory variables, the various 
specifications in table 2 were re-run dropping individual variables one at a time.  The 
results presented in table 2 were found to be robust to these exclusions.  
 These results provide suggestive empirical 
support for the hypothesis that official reserve accumulation may, at least in part, be 
working to loosen the financial constraints faced by developing countries with 
underdeveloped financial markets. 
                                                 
17 One possible explanation for this is that the Obstfeld, Stambaugh and Taylor paper is more focused on 
explaining cross-country (between) differences in reserve accumulation, while the inclusion of country 
fixed effects in this paper puts the focus on time-series (within country) variation.      16 
  A second issue that arises in these sorts of tests is endogeneity bias. Our tests 
examine whether various motivations (precautionary, mercantilist and financial 
underdevelopment) lead countries to accumulate foreign reserves.  Causality may, 
however, go the other way.  It may be that countries with high levels of foreign reserves, 
are more likely to, for example, maintain a fixed exchange rate, be the subject of a 
currency crisis, or be less concerned about developing domestic financial markets.  Or, it 
may be that whatever drives countries to accumulate reserves also leads them to certain 
exchange rate, capital control and financial market regimes.  One possible candidate for 
this underlying motivation is national legal origin.  La Porta et. al. (1998) show that legal 
origin (English, French, German or Scandinavian) helps to explain cross-country 
differences in financial development, providing a plausible instrumental variable for our 
analysis.  The estimation results using dummies for the national legal origin as 
instruments yielded qualitatively similar results to those presented in table 2, suggesting 
that endogeneity, at least between reserves and the financial development variables, is not 
a concern.
18
  Tables 4 and 5 provide two additional sets of robustness tests.  Table 4 presents 
results for the final specifications in table 2, including year fixed effects (and omitting 
country fixed effects).  The year effects are statistically significant, but again the 
coefficient estimates on the financial development measures do not change much from 
those reported in table 2.  Interestingly, in these “between” regressions the capital 
controls variable is positive and highly significant (suggesting that countries with more 
 
                                                 
18 Another approach, taken by Cheung and Ito (2009) and Ito and Chinn (2008), is to use period averages 
rather than annual data to avoid time dependent endogeneity.  Ito and Chinn (2008) also instrument for 
financial development with the legal origin dummies in their panel regressions explaining current account 
balances, national saving and investment.    17 
controls accumulate higher reserves).  Unsurprisingly the year-fixed effects sweep out the 
crisis dummy.   Finally, Table 5 pools the various countries into seven regionally based 
groups.  These robustness checks confirm the basic results presented in table 2, reserve 
accumulating countries have higher private liabilities and less developed financial 
markets. 
IV.  Conclusions 
Economists have long studied the question of optimal reserve holdings by 
governments.  In the days when most countries were part of a fixed exchange rate system, 
reserves allowed countries to avoid costly adjustments to disturbances to external sectors 
of their economies.  More recently, even as many countries allow their exchange rates 
more flexibility, reserves continue to be held for both precautionary and (possibly) 
mercantilist motives.  This paper provides another rationale for reserve accumulation 
based on the distortions that arise in countries with underdeveloped financial markets. 
Data from the financial accounts of industrial and developing countries indicate that 
reserve accumulations by developing countries have increased markedly in the past 
decade.    Further, developing countries with high levels of investment receive lower, 
rather than higher, net capital inflows.  The component of the financial account that is 
driving this counter intuitive relationship is official foreign reserves. This is puzzling, in 
that standard economic models suggest that capital should flow from rich to poor 
countries. 
The negative relationship between rates of investment and capital inflows among 
developing countries is likely to reflect credit constraints.    While financial markets in 
industrial countries have deepened and broadened, financial markets in many developing   18 
countries have not kept pace.  In this context, incentives for firms in countries with less 
developed financial markets may be distorted leading to under-insurance against future 
credit constraints.  Sterilized reserve accumulation by governments results in a subsidy to 
the private sector, inducing it to save (through purchases of government bonds) as a way 
of insuring against future financing constraints. 
The simple model presented in the paper provides two important empirical 
predictions for reserve accumulating countries.  They are first, that the private sectors of 
these countries will underinsure against capital shortfalls, and second, that their financial 
markets will be relatively underdeveloped.  Proxies for both these characteristics explain 
reserve holdings for 56 industrialized and developing countries over the period 1977-
2004. Hence, it appears that the accumulation of foreign reserves by governments of 
developing countries may represent sensible responses to prevailing economic conditions.  
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Data Appendix 
 
I.  Developing countries included in the panel estimates 
 
COUNTRY  IFS_code 
Argentina  213 
Brazil  223 
Chile  228 
China  924 
Colombia  233 
Czech Republic  935 
Egypt  469 
Estonia  939 
Hong Kong  532 
Hungary  944 
India  534 
Indonesia  536 
Israel  436 
Latvia  941 
Lithuania  946 
Malaysia  548 
Mexico  273 
Pakistan  564 
Peru  293 
Philippines  566 
Poland  964 
Russia  922 
Saudi Arabia  456 
Singapore  576 
Slovak Republic  936 
Slovenia  961 
South Africa  199 
South Korea  542 
Taiwan  528 
Thailand  578 
Turkey  186 
Venezuela  299 
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II.  Industrial Countries included in the panel estimates 
 
COUNTRY  IFS_code 
Australia  193 
Austria  122 
Belgium  124 
Canada  156 
Denmark  128 
Euro Area  163 
Finland  172 
France  132 
Germany  134 
Greece  174 
Iceland  176 
Ireland  178 
Italy  136 
Japan  158 
Luxembourg  137 
Netherlands  138 
New Zealand  196 
Norway  142 
Portugal  182 
Spain  184 
Sweden  144 
Switzerland  146 
United Kingdom  112 
United States  111 
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III.  Panel Estimation Variable Definitions (unless otherwise noted data are 
available for all 56 countries from 1977-2004). 
 
Capital Controls (CC): the Chinn and Ito (2006) capital controls index (kaopen), inverted 
so higher number indicates more binding controls.  Mean zero, min=-2.6025, max=1.767. 
Excludes: Luxembourg; Netherlands, 1977-1980; Switzerland, 1977-1995; 
Taiwan; Russia, 1977-1997; China, 1979-1983; Czech Republic, 1977-1997; 
Slovak Republic, 1977-1997; Estonia, 1977-1997; Latvia, 1977-1997; Hungary, 
1977-1997; Lithuania, 1977-1997; Slovenia, 1977-1997; Poland, 1977-1997 and 
1992-1997 
 
Crisis Dummy (Crisis):  based on the Frankel and Rose (1996) definition of a “crisis”: a 
nominal depreciation of the currency of at least 25 percent relative to the previous year 
that is also at least a 10 percent acceleration, year over year, in the rate of depreciation. 
 
Currency Overvaluation (CurOver): measure of currency overvaluation based on the PPP 
spot exchange rate. 
Excludes: Taiwan; Korea; Russia, 1977-1992; Czech Republic, 1977-1992; 
Slovak Republic, 1977-1992; Estonia, 1977-1992; Latvia, 1977-1991; Lithuania, 
1977-1991; Slovenia, 1977-1990; Poland, 1977-1989 
 
Exchange Rate Regime (ExRate): based on the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) de-facto 
exchange rate regime classifications until 2001, updated by the author. 
Excludes: Russia, 1977-1991; Czech Republic, 1977-1989; Slovak Republic, 
1977-1992; Estonia, 1977-1990; Latvia, 1977-1990; Lithuania, 1977-1990; 
Slovenia, 1977-1990; Poland, 1977-1987 
 
Financial Market Development Index (Fin_dev1):  external portfolio equity liabilities + 
total debt liabilities over GDP from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
Excludes: Luxembourg, 1977-1999; Greece, 1977-1985; Peru, 1977-1989; Hong 
Kong, 1977-1978; Russia, 1977-1992; China, 1977-1980; Czech Republic, 1977-
1992; Slovak Republic, 1977-1992; Estonia, 1977-1992; Latvia, 1977-1991; 
Hungary, 1977-1983; Lithuania, 1977-1992; Slovenia, 1977-1991 
 
(Alternative) Financial Market Development Index (Fin_dev2): private credit creation + 
stock market capitalization over GDP, as defined in Ito and Chinn (2008); data from the 
World Bank’s database on financial development and structure (original source: Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2000) 
Excludes: United States, 1977-1988; United Kingdom, 197-1988; Austria, 1977-
1988, 1998-1999; Belgium, 1977-1988, 1998-1999; Denmark, 1977-1988; 
France, 1977-1988, 1998-1999; Germany, 1977-1988, 1990-1991; Italy, 1977-
1988; Luxembourg, 1977-1988, 1993-1994, 1998-1999; Netherlands, 1977-1988; 
Norway, 1977-1988; Sweden, 1977-1988; Switzerland, 1977-1988; Iceland, 
1977-1994; Ireland, 1977-1995; Portugal, 1977; Spain, 1977-1988; Turkey, 1977-
1980, 1985-1986; Australia, 1977-1988; New Zealand, 1977-1988; South Africa, 
1977-1988; Argentina, 1977-1987; Brazil, 1977-1991; Chile, 1977-1978;   25 
Colombia, 1986-1987, 1989-1990; Mexico, 1977; Peru, 1977-1989; Venezuela, 
1977, 1984-1985; Israel, 1977-1988; Saudi Arabia, 1977-1991; Egypt, 1977-
1988; Taiwan; Hong Kong, 1977-1990; India, 1978-1979; Indonesia, 1977-1980; 
Malaysia, 1977; Singapore, 1977-1980; Russia, 1977-1993; China; Czech 
Republic, 1977-1994; Slovak Republic, 1977-1994; Estonia, 1977-1997; Latvia, 
1977-1995; Hungary, 1977-1991; Lithuania, 1977-1995; Slovenia, 1977-1994; 
Poland, 1977-1991 
 
(Adjusted Alternative) Financial Market Development Index (Fin_dev3): private credit 
creation adjusted by a proxy for the involvement of the government in the creation of 
private credit + stock market capitalization over GDP, as defined in Ito and Chinn (2008); 
data from the World Bank’s database on financial development and structure (original 
source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2000) 
Excludes: same observations as listed for Fin_dev2 
 
GDP: nominal GDP in millions of USD from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 
Excludes: Czech Republic, 1977-1991; Estonia, 1977-1992; Latvia, 1977-1991 
 
Imports (ShImp): share of imports in GDP, World Development Indicators 
Excludes: Taiwan; Korea; Singapore, 2000-2004; Russia, 1977-1988; Czech 
Republic, 1977-1989; Slovak Republic, 1977-1986; Estonia, 1977-1991; Latvia, 
1977-1989; Lithuania, 1977-1989; Slovenia, 1977-1989; Poland, 1977-1989 
 
M2/gdp: ratio of M2 money supply to GDP; main source: WDI; missing data filled in 
using the IFS database 
Excludes: United Kingdom; Austria, 1977-1979, 1998-2004; Belgium, 1977-
1979, 1998-2004; France, 1977-1979, 1998-2004; Germany, 1977-1979, 1999-
2004; Italy, 1977-1979, 1999-2004; Luxembourg; Netherlands, 1977-1979, 1998-
2004; Greece, 1977-1979, 2001-2004; Ireland, 1977-1981, 1999-2004; Portugal, 
1977-1979, 1999-2004; Spain; Colombia, 1986-1987, 1989-1990; Taiwan; Hong 
Kong, 1977-1991; Russia, 1977-1993; China, 1977; Czech Republic, 1977-1993; 
Slovak Republic, 1977-1993; Estonia, 1977-1991; Latvia, 1977-1993; Hungary, 
1977-1982; Lithuania, 1977-1993; Slovenia, 1977-1991; Poland, 1977-1984  
 
Private Liabilities:  total foreign liabilities of private (bank and non-bank) borrowers from 
BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics 
Excludes: United States, 1977-1998; United Kingdom, 1977-1998; Austria, 1977-
1998; Belgium, 1977-1998; Denmark, 1977-1998; France, 1977-1998; Germany, 
1977-1998; Italy, 1977-1998; Luxembourg, 1977-1998; Netherlands, 1977-1998; 
Norway, 1977-1998; Sweden, 1977-1998; Switzerland, 1977-1998; Canada, 
1977-1998; Japan, 1977-1998; Finland, 1977-1998; Greece, 1977-1982; Iceland, 
1977-1998; Ireland, 1977-1998; Portugal, 1977-1982; Spain, 1977-1998; Turkey, 
1977-1982; Australia, 1977-1982; New Zealand, 1977-1982; South Africa, 1977-
1982; Argentina, 1977-1982; Brazil, 1977-1982; Chile, 1977-1982; Colombia, 
1977-1982; Mexico, 1977-1982; Peru, 1977-1982; Venezuela, 1977-1982; Israel, 
1977-1982; Saudia Arabia, 1977-1982; Egypt, 1977-1982; Taiwan, 1977-1982;   26 
Hong Kong, 1977-1982; India, 1977-1982; Indonesia, 1977-1982; Korea, 1977-
1982; Malaysia, 1977-1982; Pakistan, 1977-1984; Philippines, 1977-1982; 
Singapore, 1977-1982; Thailand, 1977-1982; Russia, 1977-1992; China, 1977-
1982; Czech Republic, 1977-1992; Slovak Republic, 1977-1992; Estonia, 1977-
1995; Latvia, 1977-1994; Hungary, 1977-1982; Lithuania, 1977-1992 and 1994-
1995; Slovenia, 1977-1992; Poland, 1977-1982 
 
Public Liabilities:  total foreign liabilities of public borrowers from BIS Consolidated 
Banking Statistics 
Excludes: United States, 1977-1998; United Kingdom, 1977-1998; Austria, 1977-
1998; Belgium, 1977-1998; Denmark, 1977-1998; France, 1977-1998; Germany, 
1977-1998; Italy, 1977-1998; Luxembourg, 1977-1998; Netherlands, 1977-1998; 
Norway, 1977-1998; Sweden, 1977-1998; Switzerland, 1977-1998; Canada, 
1977-1998; Japan, 1977-1998; Finland, 1977-1998; Greece, 1977-1982; Iceland, 
1977-1998; Ireland, 1977-1998; Portugal, 1977-1982; Spain, 1977-1998; Turkey, 
1977-1982; Australia, 1977-1982; New Zealand, 1977-1982; South Africa, 1977-
1982; Argentina, 1977-1982; Brazil, 1977-1982; Chile, 1977-1982; Colombia, 
1977-1982; Mexico, 1977-1982; Peru, 1977-1982; Venezuela, 1977-1982; Israel, 
1977-1982; Saudia Arabia, 1977-1982; Egypt, 1977-1982; Taiwan, 1977-1982; 
Hong Kong, 1977-1982; India, 1977-1982; Indonesia, 1977-1982; Korea, 1977-
1982; Malaysia, 1977-1982; Pakistan, 1977-1984; Philippines, 1977-1982; 
Singapore, 1977-1982; Thailand, 1977-1982; Russia, 1977-1992; China, 1977-
1982; Czech Republic, 1977-1992; Slovak Republic, 1977-1992; Estonia, 1977-
1995; Latvia, 1977-1994; Hungary, 1977-1982; Lithuania, 1977-1992 and 1994-
1995; Slovenia, 1977-1992; Poland, 1977-1982 
 
Private/Public Liabilities_loc: private and public (public sector and non-bank private 
sector) liabilities from the BIS Locational bank statistics data  
Excludes: Luxembourg, 1977-1982; Taiwan; Russia, 1977-1992; Czech Republic, 
1977-1992; Slovak Republic, 1977-1992; Estonia, 1977-1992; Latvia, 1977-1992; 
Lithuania, 1977-1992; Slovenia, 1977-1992 
 
Reserves: total foreign reserves from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 
Excludes: Luxembourg, 1977-1983, 1998; Russia, 1977-1992; Czech Republic, 
1977-1992; Slovak Republic, 1977-1992; Estonia, 1977-1991; Latvia, 1977-1991; 
Hungary, 1977-1981; Lithuania, 1977-1991; Slovenia, 1977-1990 
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IV.  Country Groups used in Pooled regressions 
 
1.  East Asia and Pacific 
2.  Europe and Central Asia 
3.  Latin America and Caribbean 
4.  Middle East and North Africa 
5.  South Asia 
6.  Sub-Saharan Africa 
7.  North America  
 
1. East Asia and Pacific 
•  China 
•  Indonesia 
•  Korea 
•  Malaysia 
•  Philippines 
•  Thailand 
•  Japan 
•  Australia 
•  New Zealand 
•  Taiwan 
•  Hong Kong 
•  Singapore 
2. Europe and Central Asia 
•  Latvia 
•  Lithuania 
•  Poland 
•  Russia 
•  United Kingdom 
•  Austria 
•  Belgium 
•  Denmark 
•  France 
•  Germany 
•  Italy 
•  Luxembourg 
•  Netherlands 
•  Norway 
•  Sweden 
•  Switzerland 
•  Finland 
•  Greece 
•  Iceland   28 
•  Portugal 
•  Spain 
•  Czech Republic 
•  Slovak 
•  Estonia 
•  Hungary 
•  Slovenia 
3. Latin America and Caribbean 
•  Argentina 
•  Brazil 
•  Chile 
•  Columbia 
•  Mexico 
•  Peru 
•  Venezuela 
4. Middle East and North Africa 
•  Egypt  
•  Turkey 
•  Israel 
•  Saudi Arabia 
5. South Asia 
•  India 
•  Pakistan 
6. Sub-Saharan Africa 
•  South Africa 
7. North America 
•  Canada 
•  United States 
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Figure 1  
Foreign Reserves as a Percent of GDP, 1977-2004 
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Figure 2 
Foreign Reserves and Net Liabilities for Developing Countries, 1977-2004 
(Billions of US dollars) 
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Figure 3 
Foreign Reserves as a Share of Net FDI Liabilities, 1977-2004 
 
 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) external wealth of nations database. 
   32 
Figure 4 
Investment and Foreign Reserves for Developing Countries 
 
 






y =  .237x -.057  
R
2 =  0.241   33 
Figure 5 
Financial Market Development, Fin_dev1, 1977-2004 
(based on the size of foreign equity and debt liabilities) 
 
 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2007) external wealth of nations database; measured as 
the sum of foreign equity and debt liabilities over GDP; excludes Luxembourg.   34 
Figure 6 
Financial Market Development, Fin_dev2, 1988-2004 
(based on domestic market size) 
 
Source: World Bank database on financial development and structure, measured as the 
sum of a country’s private credit creation and stock market capitalization as a ratio of 
GDP.  35 
Figure 7  
Ratio of M2 money supply to GDP, 1980-2004 
  
 
Source: World Development Indicators; excludes Euro-zone countries after 1999.  36 
Table 1 
Reserve Accumulation and the Financial Account 1990-2004 
 
Financial Account Category  Industrial Countries  Developing Countries 
     
Composition of the increase 
in gross foreign assets     
FDI  22.90  14.87 
Portfolio  19.19  9.99 
Other  55.64  33.38 
Reserves  2.27  41.76 
     
Composition of the increase 
in gross foreign liabilities     
FDI  19.35  41.57 
Portfolio  19.25  20.06 
Other  61.41  38.37 
     
BIS decomposition of 
foreign liabilities     
Public  22.08  30.49 
Private  77.92  69.51 
 
 
Sources: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics and Bank for International Settlements   37 
 Table 2 
  Panel Regressions Explaining Reserve Holdings based on Precautionary, 
Mercantilist and Financial Market Underdevelopment Motivations 
(Country-Fixed Effects) 
   
 
  Standard 
Specification: 
Precautionary 


















































































































Country fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
R
2 within  .72  .77  .78  .77 
R
2 between  .78  .81  .82  .83 
Time observations  1017  1017  1017  712 
# of Countries  50  50  50  49 
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively.  See data appendix III 
for explanations of the variables and data sources.  
1 This measure of financial market development is based on each country’s foreign equity and bond 
liabilities (graphed in figure 5). 
2 This measure of financial market development is based on each country’s domestic equity and bond 
liabilities (graphed in figure 6); this measure  is not available for China and is also unavailable for a number 
of countries prior to 1988 (see Appendix III for details).     38 





See Data Appendix III for explanations of the variables and data sources
 
 
1 Fin_dev1 is a measure of financial market development based on each country’s foreign equity and bond 
liabilities (graphed in figure 5). 
2 Fin_dev2 is a measure of financial market development based on each country’s domestic equity and bond 
liabilities (graphed in figure 6); this measure  is not available for China and is also unavailable for a number 
of countries prior to 1988 (see Appendix III for details).   
   
reserves fin_dev (1) fin_dev (2) gdp kaopen M2/gdp public_liab private_liab
reserves 1
fin_dev (1) 0.2028 1
fin_dev (2) 0.4076 0.5904 1
gdp 0.6823 -0.0721 0.2811 1
kaopen -0.3637 -0.4171 -0.3684 -0.3724 1
M2/gdp 0.5823 0.4529 0.7495 0.3406 -0.4141 1
public_liab 0.5851 0.3084 0.4083 0.7648 -0.4105 0.3224 1
private_liab 0.7518 0.4355 0.5641 0.7791 -0.5929 0.5993 0.8176 1  39 
Table 4  
Panel Regressions Explaining Reserve Holdings based on Precautionary, 
Mercantilist and Financial Market Underdevelopment Motivations 
(Year-Fixed Effects) 
 




























































Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects  No  No 
R
2 within  .75  .74 
R
2 between  .87  .92 
Time observations  1017  712 
# of Countries  50  49 
 
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively.  See data appendix III 
for explanations of the variables and data sources.  
1 This measure of financial market development is based on each country’s foreign equity and bond 
liabilities (graphed in figure 5). 
2 This measure of financial market development is based on each country’s domestic equity and bond 
liabilities (graphed in figure 6); this measure  is not available for China and is also unavailable for a number 
of countries prior to 1988 (see Appendix III for details).     40 
Table 5  
Panel Regressions Explaining Reserve Holdings based on Precautionary, 




































































Time observations  1017  712 
# of Country 




GEE population averaged model. Standard errors (adjusted for clustering on group) are in 
parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, 
respectively.  See data appendix III for explanations of the variables and data sources.  
Country groups are described in data appendix IV 
1 This measure of financial market development is based on each country’s foreign equity and bond 
liabilities (graphed in figure 5). 
2 This measure of financial market development is based on each country’s domestic equity and bond 
liabilities (graphed in figure 6); this measure  is not available for China and is also unavailable for a number 
of countries prior to 1988 (see Appendix III for details).   
 
 